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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 880055-CA

:

DAVID BRUCE GEER,
Defendant.

:

Priority No. 2

:
i

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction £nd judgment for
bigamy, a third degree felony, following a guilty plea in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7p-2a-3(2)(e) (1987)
and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant waived the tight to appeal the

trial court's pre-trial denial of defendant's motions to dismiss
and to suppress.
2.

Whether defendant was selected for prosecution by

the State based upon standards that denied him equal protection
of the law.
3.

Because the trial court did not rule on the

substance of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence
seized, whether the issue can be considered on appeal.
4.

In the alternative, was the inventory proper and

was defendant's subsequent confession tainted by prior unlawful
conduct by the police.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David Bruce Geer, was charged by information
with bigamy, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-101 (1978), and falsification of government record, a
class B misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511
(1978).

Defendant filed motions in limine to dismiss the

information and to suppress physical evidence seized from him,
statements made by a third person, and his confession.

The trial

court denied the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to
suppress with respect to defendant's confession; the court made
no ruling with respect to the remainder of the motion to
suppress.

Defendant then entered a plea of guilty to the charge

of bigamy in exchange for dismissal of the charge of
falsification of government record, reserving the right to appeal
the trial court's ruling on the motions in limine.
STATEMENT PF THE FACTS
David Bruce Geer has, by his own admission, been
married to 13 different women while having no knowledge that he
has ever been divorced (T. 25-26).*

Defendant confessed to the

charge of bigamy in the present case; he informed the
investigating officer that he was married at the time he married
the complainant, Colleen Edwards (R. 3; T. 25-26) .

1

The transcript of the hearing on December 21, 1987, has been
numbered into the record on appeal as R. 54; the individual pages
of the transcript have not been numbered into the record.
Therefore, all references denoted by •(T.
)" refer to the page
number as found in the hearing transcript.
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Sergeant Mann, a member of the Utah Highway Patrol who
is currently assigned to the Utah State Organized Crime Bureau,
met with Ms. Edwards on November 3, 1987, after she had contacted
his office to report the activities of defendant, her husband (T.
11-12).

Prior to the meeting, Sgt. Mann discovered through the

National Crime Information Computer that defendant was wanted on
an outstanding felony warrant for fraud in the State of Missouri,
and Sgt. Mann obtained a copy of the warrant (T. 13)• At the
meeting, Ms. Edwards informed Sgt. Mann of defendant's suspicious
activities.

She reported that defendant had a number of credit

cards in his possession that did not appear to be his and bore
the names of other women, that he had been piaking calls to
various dating services, and that he traveled extensively while
he had no obvious means of support (T. 12). Ms. Edwards informed
Sgt. Mann that defendant was scheduled to arrive at the Salt Lake
International Airport on the night of November 14, 1987 (T. 13).
On November 5, 1987, Sgt. Mann contacted Detective Mike
Payne of the Fulton County, Missouri, Sheriff's Office, the
office that had issued the felony arrest warrant on defendant.
Sgt. Mann was informed that defendant was wanted on the fraud
charge as the result of having passed bad checks drawn on a
checking account in the name of David B. Geer or Deborah
Syversen-Geer held at the Lakeside National Bank (T. 16).
On the night of November 14, 1987, Sgt. Mann was
present when defendant arrived at the airport and arrested him on
the felony warrant (T. 13, 20). At the time of the arrest,
defendant was carrying three pieces of luggage, which included a
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black leather briefcase, a camera bag containing "expensive
camera equipment," and a suitcase containing clothes (T. 20). At
the time defendant was arrested, he was informed of his rights
under Miranda and was subsequently taken to the organized crimes
office for questioning prior to being booked into the Salt Lake
County jail (T. 22).
Jail policy prohibits storage of large personal items
belonging to an arrested person at the jail and requires the
arresting agency to store them (T. 22). Once defendant was
arrested, Sgt:. Mann became responsible for the safekeeping of the
luggage (T. 18, 22). In accordance with policy established by
the Utah Highway Patrol concerning items that are in a
defendant's possession at the time of arrest that are not
otherwise disposed of, Sgt. Mann performed an inventory on the
luggage prior to storing it in a locked area at his office (T.
17-18, 23). Sgt. Mann was not conducting a search during the
inventory (T. 14). He had previously advised defendant that he
would have to inventory the luggage and defendant apparently
responded only that he wanted to be present during the inventory.
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
questioned Sgt. Mann about three items found in defendant's
possession, including a checkbook, credit cards, and a
telephone/address directory; it appears that these are the items
of "physical evidence" defendant sought to suppress.

During the

inventory, Sgt. Mann observed a checkbook imprinted with the
names of David Bruce Geer and Deborah Syverson Geer, and, based
upon the information he had been given by the detective in
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Missouri concerning the fraud charge resulting from a bad check
drawn on the account in this name held at the Lakeside National
Bank, Sgt. Mann believed the checkbook to be evidence of a crime
(T. 16, 17), During discussion about the credit cards, defendant
located and showed Sgt. Mann the address/telephone directory so
that Sgt. Mann could contact the apparent owner, Janice Ruben (T.
18-19).

The address book contained the names of other women as

well, who were categorized alphabetically by state (e.g., under
"A" were those residing in Alabama, etc.) (T+ 25).
After defendant was booked into thfc Salt Lake County
jail on the night of his arrest, Sgt. Mann had no more contact
with him until November 16, 1987.

When Sgt. Mann arrived at work

on the 16th, he found two messages from defendant awaiting him
(T. 23).

In response to the messages, Sgt. Mann went to the jail

(T. 23). At defendant's request, he was taken later that day to
Sgt. Mann's office to discuss the allegations (T. 23, 24).
Defendant was again informed of his Miranda rights, waived them,
and told the officers, over the next four hours, the details of
his activities (T. 24).
Defendant filed two motions in limine, including a
motion to dismiss the charges based on allegations of selective
prosecution which denied defendant equal protection and a motion
to suppress "all physical evidence discovered after defendant was
stopped at Salt Lake International Airport," "[a]ny and all
statements of Janice Ruben," and "[a]ny and all statements of
Defendant" (R. 9, 17). On December 21, 1987, the trial court
heard defendant's motions in limine (R. 54). Defense counsel
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elicited testimony from Sgt. Mann concerning a checkbook found in
defendant's briefcase, credit cards in defendant's wallet, and a
telephone/address directory, the latter of which defendant had
obtained and shown to the officers (T. 15, 17-19).

Following

oral argument by counsel for defendant and the State, the court
denied the motion to dismiss (T. 40). With respect to the motion
to suppress, the court found no impropriety concerning the
initial stop and the inventory and storage of the luggage, and
the court denied the motion with respect to defendant's
confession.

In response to a representation by the State that

the issue concerning the seizure of the credit cards and
checkbook was moot in view of the fact that there was no
intention to offer them at trial (T. 32, 39), the court, while
noting that defense counsel was "reading more into this than the
Court sees as far as the fruit of the poison tree" made no ruling
with respect to their admissibility (T. 40). The court also made
no ruling with respect to the admissibility of statements made by
Janice Ruben and the telephone/address directory in defendant's
possession, which were made part of the written motion but were
not addressed at the close of the hearing on the motion to
suppress.
Immediately after the trial court's ruling on the
motions, defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of bigamy;
in accordance with a plea negotiation, the misdemeanor was
dismissed (T. 41). Defendant entered the plea despite his intent
to appeal the court's ruling on the motions to dismiss and
suppress (T. 41). This was apparently done without objection
from the prosecution or the court (T. 41-44).
-6-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By entering a plea of guilty, defendant admitted to the
correctness of the allegation against him and waived all
potential claims of error in the trial court.

He, therefore,

cannot appeal the pre-trial rulings by the trial court denying
his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress.
Regardless, a prosecutor has broad discretion with
respect to who is selected for prosecution and defendant was not
selected for prosecution based upon impermissible standards in
violation of his constitutional rights, as . There was no abuse
of discretion in this case and no violation of equal protection
standards.

Defendant must show, and has not, that the

prosecution of him had a discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
The trial court made no ruling on the admissibility of
physical evidence, specifically the checkbook and credit cards,
located in defendant's possession that was seized by police
during an inventory because the State had no intention of
offering into evidence either the checkbook or the credit cards.
Additionally, with the exception of defendant's confession, the
court made no ruling on the admissibility of the remaining
evidence, that defendant had moved to suppress but apparently
abandoned during the hearing.

Therefore, even if the issue was

not waived by the entry of the guilty plea, there is no issue
with respect to the suppression of physical evidence for this
Court to review*
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The only potential bearing the seizure of items might
have is with respect to defendant's allegation that his
confession was "fruit of the poisonous tree."

In the event this

Court finds some relevance to this argument, the inventory of
defendant's luggage was proper and not a pretext for a search
without a warrant.

The seizure of the incriminatory items,

although moot, was proper and did not violate his fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizure.

Defendant's confession, which was remote in time to the

arrest and inventory and was attenuated from the seizure of any
items, was not, as alleged, "fruit of the poisonous tree" and was
admissible evidence*

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, A DEFENDANT CANNOT ENTER A
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY AND PRESERVE THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL A TRIAL COURT'S PRE-TRIAL
RULING.
When defendant entered his guilty plea, according to
Utah case law, he waived any question as to the propriety of the
trial court's pre-trial rulings and, therefore, he is without
standing to challenge the trial court's ruling on his motion to
dismiss and motion to suppress.
In Utah, "[a] plea of guilty is a confession of the
correctness of the accusation which dispenses with the necessity
of proof thereof.•
385 (1946).

State V. Stewart, H O Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383,

Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily

entered, no issues exist for trial, fftate v. Yeckf 566 P.2d 1248
(Utah 1977).

Once a defendant enters a plea of guilty he waives
-8-

any claim of error.

State v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978).

Beck, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder.

In

On appeal,

defendant claimed the statement of the peace officer in the
warrant of arrest was insufficient to justify a finding of
probable cause.

The Court found that defendant's plea of guilty

resulted in a waiver of any claim of error on the part of the
officer.

£££ Al£G State v. Turner. 30 Utah 2d 286, 517 P.2d 536

(1973).
The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether to allow a defendant to enter a guilty plea and
simultaneously preserve the right to appeal the rulings on
pretrial suppression motions addressing constitutional issues
arising from a search.

In Tompkins v. State. 705 P.2d 836 (Wyo.

1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1052 (1986), the Court held that a
defendant could not make a conditional plea and preserve the
right to appeal suppression issues, and remanded the case for a
taking of the proper plea.

The Court stated that "[t]he general

rule in criminal cases is that a defendant who pleads guilty is
deemed to have admitted all of the elements of the crime charged,
and that he thus waives all nonjurisdictional defenses."
839.

Id* at

S&& alfifi, VallQ V, State. 726 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1986).

The

Court found that the Wyoming rule governing pleas in criminal
cases, which differs only slightly in substance from Utah R.
Crim. P. 11 (1958), does not provide for a conditional plea of
guilty.

Rule 11, Utah R. Crim. P., likewise does not provide for

the entry of a conditional plea, but only for a plea of "not
guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or
guilty and mentally ill."
-9-

Although the State would ordinarily argue that because
defendant pled guilty he has waived any claim of error for
purposes of appeal, the instant case presents an unusual
situation in that the State apparently agreed mistakenly with
defendant that he could appeal the denial of his motions to
dismiss and to suppress, making his plea of guilty conditional.
A disposal of the instant case on the basis of waiver would
likely result in a petition for post-conviction relief wherein
defendant would argue that his counsel was ineffective and,
further, that prosecutorial error occurred resulting in a plea
that was involuntary and unintelligent.

Thus, the State contends

that the most expeditious and equitable manner to proceed in this
case is to remand this case to the trial court and permit
defendant to withdraw his plea.
Defendant will most likely argue to this Court that a
conditional plea of the present type aids judicial economy, in
that the parties and the court need not proceed with a trial on
the facts.

A remand by this Court would still permit the parties

to proceed in an expeditious manner.

Should the defendant decide

to plead guilty, no trial would take place.

On the other hand,

should defendant maintain his plea of not guilty, thereby
preserving the suppression issue for purposes of appeal, the
parties could stipulate to the facts and conduct a short bench
trial.
Defendant may also argue to this Court that a
conditional plea of the present type is permitted under State v.
Kay. 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986).

The State strongly encourages
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this Court to limit the decision in Kay to the facts.

In Kay,

the Utah Supreme Court found that a judge could accept a guilty
plea in a homicide case conditioned upon an agreement not to
impose the death penalty.

According to the Court, nothing in

Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(f) (Supp. 1987),
prohibits a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to impose a
sentence lawfully within its power.

!£. at 1300.

acceptance of that conditional plea was proper,

Thus, the

ifi. at 1301.

It

is important to note that Kay was decided under subsection (f) of
Rule 11; subsection (f) is irrelevant here.
It is true that Rule 11 does not specifically prohibit
conditional pleas of the type at issue in the present case,
wherein defendant wishes to plead guilty and appeal a pre-trial
ruling.

However, in the instant case, the circumstances of which

differ from those in Kay* Utah case law clearly does not permit
defendant to plead guilty and then raise errors on appeal other
than voluntariness of the plea. 2

State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248

(Utah 1977); State v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978).

Further,

the acceptance of a conditional plea of the present type
militates against achieving finality in the criminal process.
Where infcax.the condition pertained only to what punishment
would be imposed at sentencing, here defendant wishes to preserve

z

It is apparent from Eax that no Utah law existed which
prohibited a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement
that asked the court to commit itself in advance to impose a
sentence within its power.
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for appeal the very factual basis upon which his guilty plea
rests.

In Kay* the defendant admitted fully the factual basis

for his plea but only agreed to do so if he would receive a
particular sentence.

Here, defendant wishes to avoid a trial

while still disputing the very foundation of his plea.

Because

of the present Utah case law on guilty pleas, this Court should
not read Kay as permitting conditional pleas of the present type
and instead should limit Kay to its facts.

In any event, should

this Court question the applicability of the Kay decision to the
present case, that question is one for the Supreme Court to
decide, since a ruling that Kay is applicable would result in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Beck and Yeck being overruled.
Although an intermediate court of appeals is certainly
free to criticize the rulings of the superior appellate court,
£££# e.g,, Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles. 110 Cal.3d 470,
168 Cal. Rptr. 36, 37-38 (Cal. App. 1980), in performing the
primary "error-correcting" function in a two-tiered appellate
system, it is not in a position to overrule superior authority,
and it generally should refrain from performing its "lawdeclaring" function in cases of great moment.

See State v.

Grawien- 123 Wis.2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Wis. App.
1985); Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1986) (authorizing
certification of issues to Supreme Court).
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POINT U
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SELECTED FOR PROSECUTION
BASED UPON STANDARDS THAT DENIED HIM EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion
to dismiss was not erroneous as the defendant was not selectively
prosecuted.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently

recognized that the conscious exercise of some selectivity in the
decision of whom to prosecute does not violate constitutional
protections.

So long as this decision is not based on

unjustifiable standards of race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification, there is no violation of equal protection.

Oyler

v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
This principle was also recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Starlight Club. 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912
(Utah 1965).

In Starlight, the defendant claimed that his rights

had been violated because there had been only one other
prosecution under the relevant statute in the preceding two
years.

The Court found the argument that "because no one else

was prosecuted, defendant was persecuted to be without merit....
We think such a conclusion is a non sequitur that could lead to
rather startling results, requiring for example that a convicted
burglar could demand release since many other burglars had not
been prosecuted and convicted, or had not been treated exactly
the same." Id. at 914. &££. Al&Q. State v. Judd. 27 Utah 2d 79,
493 P.2d 604 (Utah 1972) (putative father was not denied equal
protection because others were similarly situated but not
prosecuted)•
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The defendant cites Wayte v. United States. 470 U.S.
598 (1985) as authority for his position that the action must be
dismissed.

Defendant's reliance on Wayte is misplaced.

In Wayte

the defendant was required to register with the Selective Service
System, but failed to register and wrote several letters to
government officials reporting that fact and his intent not to
register in the future.

Despite warning letters and efforts to

persuade him to register, the defendant continued to refuse to
register and was indicted for knowingly and willfully failing to
register.

The district court dismissed the indictment on the

ground that the government had failed to rebut the defendants
prima facie case of selective prosecution.

The United States

Court of Appeals reversed, and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The United States

Supreme Court held that the government's passive enforcement
policy, under which it prosecuted only those non-registrants who
reported themselves or were reported by others, did not violate
the first amendment or the equal protection clause of the fifth
amendment.

The Supreme Court in so holding had occasion to

review extensively the question of selective prosecution.
Court stated:
In our criminal justice system, the
Government retains "broad discretion" as to
whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin.
457 U.S. 368, 380, n.ll, (1982); A£££ui,
Marshall v. Jerrico. Inc.. 446 U.S. 238, 248
(1980). "tSlo long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his

•14-

The

discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978). This broad discretion
rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly illsuited to judicial review. Such factors as
the strength of the case, the prosecutionfs
general deterrence value, the Government's
enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the Government's overall
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake. . . .

It is appropriate to judge selective
prosecution claims according to ordinary
equal protection standards. See Oyler v.
Boles, supra. Under our prior cases, these
standards require petitioner to show both
that the passive enforcement system had a
discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.

Feeney, 442 u.s. 256 (1979); Arlington
Heights Vt Metropolitan Housing Pevelopment
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v.
CaSLiSr 426 U.S. 229 (1976). . . .
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-609 (footnotes omitted).
In the instant case, according to these standards,
there has not been selective prosecution of defendant.

In order

to prevail, defendant must show that the prosecution had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.

Merely pointing out that others exist

who were not prosecuted does not meet the requisite showing.
Further, defendant's allegations that his prosecution was based
on religion, or more specifically lack of religious belief, is
ill-founded.

The prosecutor had no knowledge of defendant's

religious preference, if any, and it is the policy of his office
to prosecute all those engaged in bigamy when there is a
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reasonable likelihood of success at trial (T. 24-26).

In this

case, the evidence was compelling and included a complaining
witness-spouse, which is unlike the situation in most polygamous
relationships cited by defendant (T. 25-26; R. 24-26).
Defendant argues that "[tJhere is the case of Royston
Potter who was a police officer in Murray City and who was fired
because of a polygamous relationship but not criminally
prosecuted.

Mr. Potter then filed a lawsuit against Murray City

and Isic] in the Federal District Court in and for the District
of Utah and said lawsuit was dismissed and then Mr. Potter ran
for Salt Lake County Sherifff but was defeated" (Br. App. 4.)

It

is ironic that the defendant should bring up this case; the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in its
review of the federal district court's decision in that case
stated:
"[M]ere failure to prosecute other
offenders is no basis for a finding of denial
of equal protection" Selectivity in the
enforcement of laws is subject to
constitutional constraints. Nevertheless,
the conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation so long as the
selection was not deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification.
ABL2H# 669 F.2d at 1355.
Potter v. Murray City. 760 F.2d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir. 1985),
£££!• denied 474 U.S. 849 (1985), (citations omitted).
The trial court found no violation of the standards for
prosecutorial selection set forth in Wayte and stated that there
had been "some speculations, but nothing concrete to show that
there has been any selective process..." (T. 10). The
-16-

enforcement of the bigamy law in this case did not turn on a
question of defendant's religious beliefs, or the lack thereof.
Defendant's race and national origin were not factors in this
prosecution.

Rather than marrying as a tenant of personal

belief, the defendant married women for fraudulent purposes, and
then did not divorce the previous wife before marrying the next.
Defendant admitted to Sgt. Mann to having been married thirteen
times (T. 25), and that he has no knowledge of any divorce
proceeding (T. 26). Therefore, the prosecution in this case does
not fall within the prohibited selection process that would
result in the denial to defendant the equal protection of the
laws, and defendant's claim is without merit*

POINT Ul
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SEIZED, THE ISSUE IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
Defendant claims that the inventory of his luggage
while at the organized crimes bureau office, which was done in
preparation for booking into the jail where ihe luggage could not
be stored, was a pretext for a full-blown search without a
warrant.
First, defendant waived the right to contest any ruling
that might have been made with respect to the inventory by
entering a plea of guilty to the charge of bigamy.
Regardless, there is no issue properly before this
Court for the Court to decide.

Defendant moved to suppress all

physical evidence discovered after he was stopped at the Salt
Lake International Airport, all statements made by Janice Ruben,
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and all statements made by himself (R. 17)* The trial court did
not make a ruling on defendant's motion to suppress with respect
to the seizure of physical evidence (T. 40). The trial court
ruled that the initial stop and taking of the goods into custody
was proper; however, he specifically made no ruling either for or
against defendant with respect to the seizure of the credit cards
and checkbook (T. 40)• He also made no ruling regarding the
telephone directory or the admissibility of the statements made
to the police by Janice Ruben (See T. 40). The court did make a
ruling with respect to the suppression of defendant's confession
and ruled that it was admissible (T. 40).
The trial court's decision not to rule on the
admissibility of the checkbook and credit cards was based upon
the prosecutor's representation that the State did not intend to
introduce those items into evidence and, therefore, the issue was
moot (T. 32, 39). Defendant's remedy if there had been an
unlawful search would have been suppression of the evidence.
Here, there was nothing to suppress.
It is incumbent on a moving party to obtain a ruling
from the trial court on the substance of the motion.

Failure to

obtain a ruling as the result of the trial court's declination to
rule, an abandonment of the issue at the hearing on the motion,
or otherwise precludes the movant from raising the issue on
appeal,

feldstein v. People, 159 Colo. 107, 410 P.2d 188 (Colo.

1966); State v. Knight. 78 N.M. 482, 432 P.2d 838 (N.M. 1967);
Fixico v. State. 735 P.2d 580 (Okla. App. 1987).
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POINT IV
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE INVENTORY WAS PROPER
AND DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT TAINTED BY
PRIOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OF THE POLICE.
Defendant has waived any objection to the inventory of
his luggage by, first, entering his plea of guilty, and by,
second, failing to obtain a ruling from the trial court on this
issue.

The only possible way this issue could become relevant in

this appeal is if defendant were to overcome the double waiver
and the issue is found to be relevant to defendant's contention
that the inventory and consequent seizure of items in his
possession tainted his subsequent confession and that, therefore,
the confession was fruit of the poisonous tree.

However, in the

present case, there was no poisonous tree and there was no fruit.
Defendant was arrested pursuant to a felony warrant
from Missouri obtained through the National Crime Information
Computer (T. 20). Defendant does not contest the validity of the
arrest.

At the time of his arrest, defendant had in his

possession certain items of luggage including a black leather
briefcase, a camera bag with "a lot of expensive camera
equipment," and a suitcase containing clothes (T. 20). After
being questioned at the organized crime bureau office in Murray,
defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County jail (T. 22). The
jail will not accept large items such as the items of luggage
that defendant was carrying, and it, therefore, became the
officers responsibility to store the items (T. 22-23).
It is well established that this Court should "not
disturb the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of
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evidence unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error."

State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985); £ia£fi.

v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah 1986).

Further, the trial

judge is in the best position to determine the reasonableness of
the conduct under the particular facts of each case.

State v.

Houser. 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983).
It is also well established that inventory searches are
an exception to the warrant requirement.
U.S.

Colorado v. Bertine.

, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987); Illinois v. Lafavette. 462

U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, n.8,
(1976); State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987); State v.
Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 126
(Utah 1983); State v. Crabtree. 618 P.2d 484, n.8 (Utah 1980).
In State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 126, the Utah Supreme
Court stated with approval that in "Illinois v. Lafayette, the
United States Supreme Court answered in affirmative the question
whether at the time an arrestee arrives at a police station the
officers may, without obtaining a search warrant, search a
shoulder bag in the possession of that person."

In Lafayette,

the Supreme Court held that it is not unreasonable and is not
precluded by the fourth amendment to conduct a routine inventory
procedure on all containers and articles in an arrested person's
possession at the police stationhouse incident to incarcerating
the arrested person.

The reasons determined by the United States

Supreme Court in Opperman for allowing inventory searches, cited
with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, are
three fold:

(1) to protect an owner's property while it is in
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custody of police; (2) to insure against claims of lost, stolen,
or vandalized property; and (3) to protect police officers from
danger.

State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987).
Defendant claims that the inventory search was used

merely as "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive"
(Br. App. 5-6). However, defendant does not dispute that the
arrest was made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant from Missouri,
and defendant does not claim that there were any private parties
offering or available to take possession of the items for the
defendant.

When defendant was informed of the impending

inventory, he did not request that he be allowed to store the
items in an airport locker or to make alternative arrangements,
but requested only to be present when the inventory occurred (See
T. 14).

In any event, failure of the police to make alternative

arrangements does not eliminate the justification for an
inventory.

Colorado v. Bertine.

U.S.

, 107 S. Ct. 738

(1987).
In view of these facts and the jail's policy on an
inmate's personal belongings, the officer was justified in doing
an inventory of the bags prior to placing them in the locked
storage area .
Defendant claims that since the search of his luggage
was an unconstitutional invasion of his right to privacy, that
his later confession should be ruled to be "fruit of the
poisonous tree" and should be suppressed.
Because the seizure was during the course of a proper
inventory, there is no problem with the later incriminating
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statement by the defendant being part of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree", as "[al confession cannot be 'fruit of the
poisonous tree1 if the tree itself is not poisonous."
v. Spring,

U.S.

Colorado

, 107 S. Ct. 851, 856 (1987).

It is important to note that the prosecution did not
intend to introduce as evidence the items that were seized during
the inventory (T. 39), therefore the exclusion of those items
would not jeopardize, or even affect, the prosecution of the
defendant on the charge of bigamy.

The prosecution would,

however, have used a statement that the defendant gave to the
police two days after his arrest.

Defendant was arrested on

November 14, 1987, and was thereafter booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail (T. 20-22).

Two days later, when Sgt. Mann arrived

at his office, he found two messages from defendant awaiting him
(T. 23). In response to those messages, Sgt. Mann went to the
jail to speak with defendant (T.23).

Defendant stated that he

wished to talk with Sgt. Mann and asked to be taken to Sgt.
Mann's office to discuss the situation.

Sgt. Mann complied with

defendant's request by later that day taking defendant to his
office where he again informed defendant of Miranda warnings and
obtained a valid waiver (T. 24)•
Defendant has never challenged the voluntariness of the
statement he gave to police.

He does not contend that he was not

informed of his Miranda rights, nor that he did not knowingly
waive the same.

Nor does defendant show that the discovery of

the items in his luggage in any way led to his incriminating
statements made to police.
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Defendant simply asserts that the inventory was a
pretext for an illegal search and that his subsequent confession
was "fruit of the poisonous tree." One who moves to suppress
evidence must support the motion with proof.
680 P.2d 749 (Utah 1984)

State v. Hinton.

Defendant did not meet this requisite

showing, as determined by the trial court.
Defendant ignores the fact that in order for a
confession to be fruit of the poisonous tree, there must be some
nexus between the illegally seized items and the subsequent
confession. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
Narflpne V, United StateSr 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Dunaway v. New
York. 442 U.S. 200 (1979); State v. Romero. 624 P.2d 699 (Utah
1981).

There was no illegality in the seizure of evidence.

Regardless, the confession came some two days after the inventory
and there is no evidence that the inventory and the subsequent
confession were related in any manner or that the confession was
the product or result of the inventory.

The confession was so

attenuated from the evidence obtained, that even if there had
have been some impropriety, the confession was not "fruit of the
poisonous tree."
Defendant cites Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S.
471, (1963) as support for the proposition that the confession
was tainted.

The instant case is easily distinguishable from the

facts of Wono Sun.

Pirst, in Wong Sun, the defendant was

illegally arrested after officers broke into his business-home.
In the instant case, the officer made an arrest, the validity of
which is uncontested by defendant, pursuant to an outstanding
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Missouri felony warrant.

In Wong Sun, the statements in question

were made immediately after the illegal arrest—in fact, within
minutes.

371 U.S. at 410-411.

In the instant case, the

statements were made, as defendant admits, "two days after his
arrest" (Br. App. 8). Even if the items seized were seized
illegally, the seizure was so unconnected in space and time with
the statements made by defendant "two days after his arrest,"
that the confession is not "tainted" in the sense of the word
used in Wong Sun.

Therefore, the trial court's ruling that

defendant's confession was admissible was not error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests this Court to remand this case to the trial
court, or, in the alternative, to affirm the decision of the
trial court as to the pre-trial motions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of May, 1988.
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